A player of privately known strength chooses when to enter a market, and an incumbent chooses whether to compete or concede. Information about the potential entrant's type is revealed publicly according to an exogenous news process and the timing of entry. I analyze stationary equilibria using...

We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage-game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage-game actions of player one perfectly. Player one's type is...

In a setting where an infinite population of players interact locally and repeatedly, we study the impacts of payoff structures and network structures on contagion of a convention beyond 2×2 coordination games. First, we consider the “bilingual game”, where each player chooses one of two...

This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by...

We consider a sequential decision problem where the decision maker is informed of the actual payoff with delay. We introduce a new condition, which generalizes the condition given by Blackwell and ensures that the decision maker can approach a fixed closed and convex set under delay. We show how...

This paper proposes a micro-foundation for knowledge spillovers. I model a city in which free knowledge transfers are bids by experts to entrepreneurs who auction jobs. These knowledge bids resemble a consultant's pitch to a potential client. Two fundamental properties of knowledge underlie the...

This paper studies price dynamics in a setting in which a monopolist sells a new experience good over time to many buyers, and the seller can neither price discriminate among the buyers nor commit to a price rule. Buyers learn from their own experiences about the effectiveness of the product....

Information about asset quality is often not disclosed to asset markets. What principles determine when a financial regulator should disclose or withhold information? We explore this question using a risk-sharing model with intertemporal trade and limited commitment. Information about future...