Similar Search Results

Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core

Okada, Akira - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 3, pp. 1165-1190

In an exchange economy with incomplete information, the signaling core is defined by the set of state … underlying the signaling core is supported by a sequential equilibrium of an ultimatum bargaining game with an informed proposer … restart rule belongs to the signaling core if the belief of players satisfies a self-selection property. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572398

Subscription equilibrium with production: Non-neutrality and constrained suboptimality

Villanacci, Antonio; Zenginobuz, Ünal - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 2, pp. 407-425

We study a general equilibrium model with a non-profit firm producing a public good using private goods as inputs which are financed by voluntary contributions (subscriptions) of households. We analyze policy interventions that increase the public good level at subscription equilibria, and show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043045

Household behavior and the marriage market

Del Boca, Daniela; Flinn, Christopher J. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 150 (2014) C, pp. 515-550

There is some controversy in the field of household economics regarding the efficiency of household decisions. We make the point that a flexible specification of spousal preferences and the household production technology precludes the possibility of using revealed preference data on household...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043031

Unique equilibria and substitution effects in a stochastic model of the marriage market

Decker, Colin; Lieb, Elliott H.; McCann, Robert J.; … - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 2, pp. 778-792

Choo and Siow (2006) [7] proposed a model for the marriage market which allows for random identically distributed McFadden-type noise in the preferences of each of the participants. In this note we exhibit a strictly convex function whose derivatives vanish precisely at the equilibria of their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043032

Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces

Mishra, Debasis; Pramanik, Anup; Roy, Souvik - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 103-116

We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values environments. We show that in multidimensional single peaked type spaces, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it satisfies a familiar and simple condition called 2-cycle...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930783

Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning

Hu, Ju - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 64-73

This note extends Wiseman [6] to more general reputation games with exogenous learning. Using Gossner's [4] relative entropy method, we provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the long-lived player. The lower bound shows that when the exogenous signals are sufficiently...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930785

Communication in Cournot oligopoly

Goltsman, Maria; Pavlov, Gregory - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 152-176

This paper studies communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any information through cheap talk, and show that when these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930788

A theory of political and economic cycles

Ales, Laurence; Maziero, Pricila; Yared, Pierre - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 224-251

We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930795

Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

Siegel, Ron - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 684-702

I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930796

Optimal entry timing

Kolb, Aaron M. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 973-1000

A player of privately known strength chooses when to enter a market, and an incumbent chooses whether to compete or concede. Information about the potential entrant's type is revealed publicly according to an exogenous news process and the timing of entry. I analyze stationary equilibria using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263574

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Next
Last