In a classic model of tax competition, this paper shows that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much or too little public good provision. The key is whether there exists a unilateral incentive to deviate...

The Besley-Coate model of representative democracy has the problem of multiple equilibria (Besley-Coate 1997). We show that requiring the Besley-Coate political equilibria to be iteratively undominated at the voting stage refines the set of (pure strategy) political equilibrium outcomes only for...

Voter turnout in game theoretic models of voting has typically been difficult to predict because of the problem of multiple Nash equilibria ( <link rid="b33 b34">Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983, 1985</link>). Many of these equilibria require an extreme precision of beliefs among voters that is unlikely to be reached in real...