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Two significant challenges hamper the analyses of the collective choice of educational vouchers. One is the multi-dimensional choice set arising from the interdependence of the voucher, public education spending, and taxation. Second, even absent a voucher, preferences over public spending are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117656
Representation is one of the most important criteria by which to judge electoral systems. In this paper, I focus on one aspect of representative democracy: the formation of electoral district boundaries. It is well known that majoritarian systems give rise to highly biased seat–vote curves,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056189
, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574271
I propose a framework in which individual political participation can take two distinct forms, voting and contributing … shows that, even though each contribution has a negligible impact, the interaction between contributions and voting leads to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574319
regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574360
We study which policy tool and at what level a majority chooses in order to reduce activities with negative externalities. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the activity which produces the negative externality, a quota that forces a proportional reduction of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744247
In this paper we set up a political economy model of a two-country world economy, where an international agreement on the provisions of public goods generating cross-border externalities, such as environment protection, subject to feasibility, efficiency and equity constraints, has to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010636477
We consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a current policy variable unilaterally, but faces competition from a political opponent in the future. Both parties care about voters' payoffs, but they have different beliefs about how policy choices will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117645
We consider a political agency model where voters learn information about some policy-relevant variable, which they can ignore when it impedes their desire to hold optimistic beliefs. Voters' excessive tendency to sustain optimism may result in inefficient political decision-making because...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117653
The paper argues that for political reasons elected politicians are more likely to be engaged in targeted redistribution than appointed bureaucrats. It uses the example of patronage jobs in the U.S. local governments to provide empirical support for this claim. It shows that the number of public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117654