Showing 1 - 10 of 55
The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly, and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature’s choice. Over time, they can learn the state...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690752
counterpart of the exchangeable Bayesian learning model is also described. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700399
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498096
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498220
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498269
I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in a sequence, receive private … signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample previous actions. Unlike in standard models of observational learning … unbounded strength there is learning in a strong sense: agents' actions are ex-post optimal given both the state of the world …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022731
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically …, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702986
We study learning and information acquisition by a Bayesian agent whose prior belief is misspecified in the sense that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744140
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302218
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012201211