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Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games
Kandori, Michihiro; Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359163
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Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
Kandori, Michihiro; Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708515
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Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration
Cai, Hongbin; Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359191
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Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance
Obara, Ichiro; Rahman, David - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708345
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Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships
Rahman, David; Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708387
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The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708401
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The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827883
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Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games
McLean, Rich; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828001
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Folk Theorem with Communication
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828057