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Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman; Turocy, Theodore - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109043
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An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258037
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Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach
Azrieli, Yaron - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
. With much less information in their hands agents behave as if they see the full picture. Some properties of CCE when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835767
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Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game
Azrieli, Yaron - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player is a best response to the distribution of actions of his opponents in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837081
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Pure self-confirming equilibrium
Azrieli, Yaron - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
In a Self-Confirming Equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993A) every player obtains partial information about other … players' strategies and plays a best response to some conjecture which is consistent with his information. Two kinds of … information structures are considered: In the first each player observes his own payoff while in the second the information is the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005616913
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Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
Azrieli, Yaron; Teper, Roee - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
We consider games with incomplete information a la Harsanyi, where the payoff of a player depends on an unknown state …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107395
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Strategically Equivalent Contests
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107976
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Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109224
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Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Lee, Dongryul; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We analyze a group contest in which n groups compete to win a group-specific public good prize. Group sizes can be different and any player may value the prize differently within and across groups. Players exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently. Only the highest effort (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113205
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A generalized Tullock contest
Sheremeta, Roman; Chowdhury, Subhasish - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113445