We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning...

A possibility of the existence of a discontinuity of Prelec’s (probability weighting) function W(p) at the probability p = 1 is discussed. This possibility is supported by the Aczél–Luce question whether Prelec’s weighting function W(p) is equal to 1 at p = 1, by the purely mathematical...

A need for experiments on the certainty effect near the certainty (near the probability p = 1) is stated in this paper. The need supported by the Aczél–Luce question whether Prelec’s weighting function W(p) is equal to 1 at p = 1, by the purely mathematical restrictions and the...

This is a very draft version of the report "The random-lottery incentive system. Can p~1 experiments deductions be correct?". It is published to extend the abstract of the report. Aczél and Luce emphasized a fundamental question: whether W(1)=1 (whether the Prelec weighting function equals 1 at...

Three main groups of results have been obtained: 1) The question is emphasized whether the probability weighting function W(p) is continuous. If W(p) reveals a discontinuity at p=1, then this is a topological feature. This can qualitatively change (at least) the mathematical aspects of the...

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

We analyze a group contest in which n groups compete to win a group-specific public good prize. Group sizes can be different and any player may value the prize differently within and across groups. Players exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently. Only the highest effort (the...