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Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman; Turocy, Theodore - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109043

An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258037

Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative

Jung, Hanjoon Michael - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution concept (WCSE) for general finite-period games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium (SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general games...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025709

Strategic Information Transmission: Comment

Jung, Hanjoon Michael - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

Crawford and Sobel (1982) developed a model of strategic information transmission in which a better-informed sender … sends a possibly informative signal to a decision-making receiver and studied how strategically transmitted information is … concept and showed that the signal by the sender, the transmitted information, is more informative in pareto …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005059106

Strategically Equivalent Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107976

Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109224

Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Lee, Dongryul; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

We analyze a group contest in which n groups compete to win a group-specific public good prize. Group sizes can be different and any player may value the prize differently within and across groups. Players exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently. Only the highest effort (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113205

A generalized Tullock contest

Sheremeta, Roman; Chowdhury, Subhasish - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113445

Strategic Information Transmission through the Media

Jung, Hanjoon Michael - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

We model media manipulation in which a sender or senders manipulate information through the media to influence … reporting accurate information and if the receivers face a coordination situation without information about their opponents … manipulating the information through the media, which makes the report common knowledge. This is true even when the sender and the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626818

Paradox of Credibility

Jung, Hanjoon Michael - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

In an information transmission situation, a sender's concern for its credibility could endow itself with an invisible … power to control the receiver's decisions so that the sender can manipulate information without being detected. In this case …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789900