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Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman; Turocy, Theodore - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109043

An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258037

A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices

Brams, Steven J.; Kaplan, Todd R; Kilgour, D. Marc - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism that induces two bargainers to be truthful in reporting their reservation prices in a 1st stage. If these prices criss-cross, the referee reports that they overlap, and the bargainers proceed to make offers in a 2nd stage. The average of the 2nd-stage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839490

Communication of uncertainty in weather forecasts

Marimo, Pricilla; Kaplan, Todd R; Mylne, Ken; Sharpe, Martin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

Experimental economics methods were used to assess public understanding of information in weather forecasts and test … whether the participants were able to make better decisions using the probabilistic information presented in table or bar … average participants provided with uncertainty information make better decisions than those without. Statistical analysis …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260548

Strategic information transmission: a mathematica tool for analysis

Dickhaut, John; Kaplan, Todd R; Mukherji, Arijit - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1992

solving two-person games of complete information. In many applications, however, "asymmetric information" is a central issue …. By asymmetric information, we mean that one party has access to information that the other party lacks. The branch of … game theory that deals with this problem is known as "games of incomplete information"; the formal model is discussed in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323637

Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions

Kaplan, Todd R; Zamir, Shmuel - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

Maskin and Riley (2003) and Lebrun (2006) prove that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of �rst-price auctions is unique. This uniqueness requires the assumption that a buyer never bids above his value. We demonstrate that, in asymmetric �rst-price auctions (with or without a minimum bid), the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009372604

Advances in Auctions

Kaplan, Todd R; Zamir, Shmuel - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107706

Strategically Equivalent Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107976

Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109224

Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Lee, Dongryul; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

We analyze a group contest in which n groups compete to win a group-specific public good prize. Group sizes can be different and any player may value the prize differently within and across groups. Players exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently. Only the highest effort (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113205