We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning...

The effect of the competition among self-regulatory organizations (SROs) on the efficiency of the corresponding goods and services markets is studied. It is shown that under certain conditions the competition among SROs worsens the quality of the goods and services and leads to decreasing...

The effect of competition among self-regulatory organizations (SRO) on the efficiency of the corresponding goods and services markets is considered. It is shown that under certain conditions the competition among SRO worsens the quality of the goods and services and leads to decrease in...

A model of the economic system with the property rights distributed among several agents is considered. The effect of property rights allocation on the economic efficiency of the management strategies is studied.

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

We analyze a group contest in which n groups compete to win a group-specific public good prize. Group sizes can be different and any player may value the prize differently within and across groups. Players exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently. Only the highest effort (the...

The effect of property rights allocation on characteristics of the vertically integrated company and properties of the corresponding market equilibria are studied. It is shown that partial integration can induce inefficient super-monopolistic market equilibria and unbalance in the functioning of...