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Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman; Turocy, Theodore - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109043
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An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258037
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When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies? A Theory of Incentives with Fear-Based Content
Lupia, Arthur; Menning, Jesse - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
are bad for voters. In it, a politician provides information about a threat. His statement need not be true. How citizens …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836312
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Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Explaining the Choices of Cognitively Limited Actors
Lupia, Arthur; Zharinova, Natasha; Levine, Adam Seth - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
Many claims about political behavior are based on implicit assumptions about human reasoning. One such assumption, that political actors think in complex and similar ways when assessing strategies, is nested within widely used game theoretic equilibrium concepts. Empirical research casts doubt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836867
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Strategically Equivalent Contests
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107976
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Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109224
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Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Lee, Dongryul; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We analyze a group contest in which n groups compete to win a group-specific public good prize. Group sizes can be different and any player may value the prize differently within and across groups. Players exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently. Only the highest effort (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113205
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A generalized Tullock contest
Sheremeta, Roman; Chowdhury, Subhasish - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113445
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Were Bush Tax Cut Supporters "Simply Ignorant?" A Second Look at Conservatives and Liberals in "Homer Gets a Tax Cut"
Lupia, Arthur; Levine, Adam S.; Menning, Jesse O.; Sin, … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
themselves as “conservative” or “Republican” – rising information levels increase support for the tax cuts. Indeed, using Bartels …’ measure of political information, we show that the Republican respondents rated “most informed” supported the tax cuts at … assumption about how information affects public opinion. He restricts all respondents -- whether liberal or conservative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789471
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Loonies Under Your Bed: Misdirected Attention and the Diluted Value of Stock Market Reports
Lupia, Arthur; Grafstrom, Cassandra; Krupnikov, Yanna; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
consequences, we propose an alternate way of presenting stock market information. The alternative is easy to implement and can help …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836479