We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning...

We reconcile �findings from the Multiple Price List method (Andersen et al., 2008) and the Convex Time Budget method (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a) that seem to have generated a heated debate in the time preference literature. Specifi�cally, we discuss the claims of Andreoni and Sprenger...

We examine whether religious priming can induce more truthful preference revelation in valuation research. Using induced value second price Vickrey auctions in both hypothetical and non-hypothetical contexts, our results suggest that religious priming can indeed induce more truthful bidding and...

We revisit the claims about the biological underpinnings of economic behavior by specifically exploring if observed gender differences in risk/time preferences can be explained by natural fluctuations in progesterone/estradiol levels during the menstrual cycle and by prenatal exposure to...

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.