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Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman; Turocy, Theodore - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109043
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An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258037
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Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors
Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
This paper considers the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information, where players are … allowed to have heterogenous priors. An equilibrium of a complete information game is robust to incomplete information under … non-common priors if for every incomplete information game where each player's prior assigns high probability on the event …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789875
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Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria
Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004
-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information (Kajii …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836420
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On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors
Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
This paper studies the impact of a small probability event on strategic behavior in incomplete information games with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837461
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Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics
Oyama, Daisuke; Takahashi, Satoru; Hofbauer, Josef - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2003
This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621218
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Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors
Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
This paper considers the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information, where players are … allowed to have heterogenous priors. An equilibrium of a complete information game is robust to incomplete information under … non-common priors if for every incomplete information game where each player's prior assigns high probability on the event …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107849
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Strategically Equivalent Contests
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107976
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Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests
Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109224
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Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics
Oyama, Daisuke; Takahashi, Satoru; Hofbauer, Josef - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2003
This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112753