This paper studies the relevance of the different factors that influence, at the territorial level, efficiency in the market for public infrastructures in Italy.

The paper presents a theoretical model with bureaucratic corruption where bribe income can leak out of an economy. In such an economy given its perception about the extent of leakage the government sets the price of public services required for entrepreneurship by maximizing the welfare of the...

We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find...

As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and...

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive....

In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more aggressively than incumbent firms. This bidding behavior makes them more susceptible to losses a¤ecting their prospect of survival. In April of 2000, the Oklahoma Department of...

This paper models a contest where several sellers compete for a contract with a single buyer. There are several styles of possible designs with a subset of them preferred by the buyer. We examine what happens when the buyer communicates information about his preferences. If the sellers are...

We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we investigate the overall winner’s curse effects on bidding behaviour. Second, we account for differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate whether the possibility of...

In this paper we argue that government procurement policy played a role in stimulating the wave of innovation that hit the US economy in the 1980's, as well as the simultaneous increase in inequality and in education attainment. Since the early 1980's U.S. policy makers began targeting...

Public purchasing authorities are in a leading position for the introduction, promotion and development of green procurement. Indeed, the public sector can influence green procurement both by designing suitable policies and by driving “green” markets through the significant share of public...