Our paper considers a “negotiation game” between two players which combines the features of two-players alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Generally, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibriums but some of which involve delay and inefficiency. Thus,...

Delayed perfect monitoring in an in�nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to...

This paper studies the possibility of cooperation based on players' preferences. Consider the following infinitely repeated game, similar to Ghosh and Ray (1996). At each stage, uncountable numbers of players are randomly matched without information about their partners' past actions and play a...

This paper studies repeated games with pure strategies and stochastic discounting under perfect information. We consider infinite repetitions of any finite normal form game possessing at least one pure Nash action profile. The period interaction realizes a shock in each period, and the...

We examine commuting in a game-theoretic setting with a continuum of commuters. Commuters' home and work locations can be heterogeneous. The exogenous transport network is arbitrary. Traffic speed is determined by link capacity and by local congestion at a time and place along a link, where...

During history, an aggressive country seeks to force non-aggressive countries to made many concessions based on military force. In our paper we discuss the situation that one aggressive country is dissatisfied with its current position and try to obtain more concessions from a rival country. To...