Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 165
Cover Image
Employer’s moral hazard and wage rigidity
albanese, marina; navarra, cecilia; Tortia, Ermanno - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
The standard explanation of wage rigidity in principal agent and in efficiency wage models is related to worker risk-aversion. However, these explanations do not consider at least two important classes of empirical evidence: (1) In worker cooperatives workers appear to behave in a less risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260540
Cover Image
Unemployment accounts
Setty, Ofer - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
Unemployment Accounts (UA) are mandatory individual saving accounts that can be used by governments as an alternative to the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system. I study a two tier UA-UI system where the unemployed withdraw from their unemployment account until it is exhausted and then receive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111364
Cover Image
A Decision Analysis Approach To Solving the Signaling Game
Cobb, Barry; Basuchoudhary, Atin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
Decision analysis has traditionally been applied to choices under uncertainty involving a single decision maker. Game theory has been applied to solving games of strategic interaction between two or more players. Building upon recent work of van Binsbergen and Marx (2007. Exploring relations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014726
Cover Image
Do repeated game players detect patterns in opponents? Revisiting the Nyarko & Schotter belief elicitation experiment
Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the seminal belief elicitation experiment by Nyarko and Schotter (2002) under the prism of pattern recognition. Instead of modeling elicited beliefs by a standard weighted fictitious play model this paper proposes a generalized variant of fictitious...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011947
Cover Image
A hidden Markov model for the detection of pure and mixed strategy play in games
Shachat, Jason; Swarthout, J. Todd; Wei, Lijia - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
We propose a statistical model to assess whether individuals strategically use mixed strategies in repeated games. We formulate a hidden Markov model in which the latent state space contains both pure and mixed strategies, and allows switching between these states. We apply the model to data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108464
Cover Image
A nested contest: Tullock meets the All-Pay Auction
Amegashie, J. Atsu - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
(lottery) contest and the all-pay auction. A Nash equilibrium exists for all parameters of the nested contest. If and only if … aggregate efforts in the all-pay auction are higher than the aggregate efforts in the Tullock contest, then aggregate efforts in … the nested contest may not lie between aggregate efforts in the all-pay auction and aggregate efforts in the Tullock …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108739
Cover Image
Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
Nessah, Rabia; Tian, Guoqiang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
This paper investigates the existence of pure strategy, dominant strategy, and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. We introduce a new notion of weak continuity, called weak transfer quasi-continuity, which is weaker than most known weak notions of continuity, including...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112019
Cover Image
Elementary game theory
Soni, Himanshu; Sharma, Damini - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015
The theory of games (or game theory) is a mathematical theory that deals with the general features of competitive situations. It involves strategic thinking, and studies the way people interact while making economic policies, contesting elections and other such decisions. There are various types...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166059
Cover Image
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2002
A buyer and a seller can exchange one unit of an indivisible good. While producing the good, the seller can exert unobservable effort (hidden action). Then the buyer realizes whether his valuation is high or low, which stochastically depends upon the seller's effort level (hidden information)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622105
Cover Image
On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
A seller and a buyer can write a contract. After that, the seller produces a good. She can influence the expected quality of the good by making unobservable investments. Only the seller learns the realized quality. Finally, trade can occur. It is always ex post efficient to trade. Yet, it may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568373