We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur in jurisdictions with referendum decisions on policy centralization. Citizens choose centralization of public spending and revenue in order to internalize spillovers if individual...

Recent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups...

Mit der rasant fortschreitenden Globalisierung und dem dynamischen Prozess der europä¬ischen Integration sind in den letzten zwei bis drei Jahrzehnten grundlegende traditionelle Denk¬kategorien über den Staat und die von ihm zu betreibende Wirtschaftspolitik systema¬tisch in Frage gestellt...

The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...

It is argued that an independent judiciary is a necessary condition for both individual liberty and economic prosperity. After having surveyed the literature dealing with how to arrange for an independent judiciary, the authors derive some additional policy implications by drawing on two...

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives’ potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an...

The traditional economic approach to tax evasion does not appear to be particularly successful in explaining the extent of tax compliance. It is often argued that reciprocity norms which establish a fiscal exchange between the state and the citizens shape tax morale to a large extent. In that...

In this paper, the introduction of direct-democratic decision-making in all EU decisions is considered when it is feasible without prohibitively increasing decision-making costs. We start with the contractarian argument that each constitution is a contract joining the citizens of a state and...

In diesem Beitrag werden die ökonomischen Argumente, die für und gegen Wettbewerbsföderalismus sprechen, zusammengefasst und mit der empirischen Evidenz aus stark wettbewerblich organisierten Föderalstaaten konfrontiert. Es zeigt sich, dass fiskalischer Wettbewerb zu einer effizienteren...

How a sustainable fiscal policy can be performed in a federal system is not only a Swiss problem but is also discussed in other federal countries like Germany and Austria, and in the European Union. Contrary to most other countries, the Swiss fiscal system is characterised by an extensive fiscal...