Showing 1 - 10 of 21
This paper studies an internet trading mechanism similar to the one described in Peters and Severinov (2000) in a market where traders values are interdependent. Conditions are given for which this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which supports allocations that are the same as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970949
Proofs of some of the theorems in <a href=\"http://microeconomics.ca/michael_peters/internetauctionsrevisshort.pdf\"> Internet Auctions with Many Traders</a>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977023
We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogenous good, set reserve prices at their own independent second-price auctions. Each buyer has a private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit. Buyers can bid as often as they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977978
Technical supplement to the paper forthcoming in Rand Journal of Economics.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970932
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970933
We study a mechanism design problem in which players can take part in a mechanism to coordinate their actions in a default game. By refusing to participate in the mechanism, a player can revert to playing the default game non-cooperatively. We show with an example that some allocation rules are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970936
This paper studies Bayesian equilibrium in a worker firm matching problem in which workers choose their human capi- tal investment and firms choose wages before the matching process occurs. Symmetric equilibrium exists, and supports assortative matching. However, when the number of traders is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970941
Two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively. The purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that trader can attain in the second stage. The paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970942
The paper proves existence of equilibrium in a fairly general version of the pre-marital investment game. The game has discontinuous payoffs, so the method of Reny (1999) is used. Three assumptions are imposed on the matching process that occurs after investments are realized. It must be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970948
This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004975579