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This paper investigates the individual and joint effects of group incentive pay and problem-solving teams on productivity. To estimate models of adoption of these work practices and models of the effects of the work practices on productivity, we constructed a data set on the operations of 34...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240520
. We begin with a theoretical exploration of optimal contest design, focusing on the number of competitors. Our theory … test of the theory implements a laboratory experiment, where important features of the theory can be exogenously imposed … models to inform us of the relevant theoretical predictions. In both cases we find that the theory has a fair amount of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056205
on the task allocation of the firm's team leaders is large and robust; team leaders increase their non-billable hours and … shift billable hours to team members. Although the motivation for the change in the compensation plan was the multitasking … problem, this change also impacted the way tasks were allocated within each team, resulting in greater teamwork …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076564
This paper shows that the informativeness principle, as originally formulated by Holmstrom (1979), does not hold if the first-order approach is invalid. We introduce a "generalized informativeness principle" that takes into account non-local incentive constraints and holds generically, even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013040535
This paper studies career concerns -- concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation -- and describes how optimal incentive contracts are affected when career concerns are taken into account. Career concerns arise frequently: they occur whenever the market uses a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013228250
Empirical work testing for a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives, a cornerstone of agency theory, has not had …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013228971
Some existing welfare programs ("work-first") require participants to work in exchange for benefits. Others ("job search-first") emphasize private job-search and provide assistance in finding and retaining a durable employment. This paper studies the optimal design of welfare programs when (i)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089023
tasks that produce unobservable outputs as they seek the salient rewards to observable outputs. Since the theory related to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013072582
This paper shows that the informativeness principle does not automatically extend to settings with limited liability. Even if a signal is informative about effort, it may have no value for contracting. An agent with limited liability is paid zero for certain output realizations. Thus, even if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047777
We develop a simple model to study rules based on instruments vs. targets. A principal faces a better informed but biased agent and relies on joint punishments as incentives. Instrument-based rules condition incentives on the agent's observable action; target-based rules condition incentives on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922207