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Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence
Edmans, Alex - 2017
three non-exclusive explanations for what drives executive pay -- shareholder value maximization by boards, rent extraction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951861
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CEO Incentives and Firm Size
Baker, George P.; Hall, Brian J. - 2021
What determines CEO incentives? A confusion exists among both academics and practitioners about how to measure the strength of CEO incentives, and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. We show that while one measure of CEO...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013234372
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Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S : Perceptions, Facts and Challenges
Kaplan, Steven N. - 2012
governance: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do … incomes. With regard to performance, CEOs are paid for performance and penalized for poor performance. Finally, boards do … appears to be market determined and boards do appear to monitor their CEOs. Consistent with that, top executive pay policies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100668
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CEO Pay and the Rise of Relative Performance Contracts : A Question of Governance?
Bell, Brian - 2016
Would moving to relative performance contracts improve the alignment between CEO pay and performance? To address this we exploit the large rise in relative performance awards and the share of equity pay in the UK over the last two decades. Using new employer-employee matched datasets we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986698
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Credit Default Swaps, Agency Problems, and Management Incentives
Lee, Jongsub - 2017
: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the … intensity of monitoring by creditors, which leads to greater CEO diversion of assets as perquisites. We further show that boards …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941985
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Corporate Governance and Risk Management at Unprotected Banks : National Banks in the 1890s
Calomiris, Charles W. - 2014
Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060693
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CEO Centrality
Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2008
We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012773127
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Performance Incentives within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
Aggarwal, Rajesh K.; Samwick, Andrew A. - 2022
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013308346
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Pay Cuts for the Boss : Executive Compensation in the 1940s
Frydman, Carola - 2011
Executive pay fell during the 1940s, marking the last notable decrease in the past 70 years. We study this decline using a new panel dataset on the remuneration of top executives in 246 firms. We find that government regulation--including explicit salary restrictions and taxation--had, at best,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121089
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Executive Compensation : Facts
Clementi, Gian Luca - 2010
In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150549