Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 190
Cover Image
Wages, Hires, and Labor Market Concentration
Marinescu, Ioana Elena; Ouss, Ivan; Pape, Louis-Daniel - 2022
How does employer market power affect workers? We compute the concentration of new hires by occupation and commuting zone in France using linked employer-employee data. Using instrumental variables with worker and firm fixed effects, we find that a 10% increase in labor market concentration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014090772
Cover Image
Flexible Staffing Arrangements and Employers' Short-Term Adjustment Strategies
Abraham, Katharine G. - 2021
This paper reports new evidence from a survey of over 408 U.S. employers concerning their use of temporary and on-call workers. More than 90 percent of responding organizations reported reliance on these flexible staffing arrangements. They accounted for an average of 1.5 percent of total labor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013245324
Cover Image
Worker Replacement
Menzio, Guido - 2010
Consider a labor market in which firms want to insure existing employees against income fluctuations and, simultaneously, want to recruit new employees to fill vacant jobs. Firms can commit to a wage policy, i.e. a policy that specifies the wage paid to their employees as a function of tenure,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013143467
Cover Image
Personnel Economics : Hiring and Incentives
Oyer, Paul - 2010
We survey the Personnel Economics literature, focusing on how firms establish, maintain, and end employment relationships and on how firms provide incentives to employees. This literature has been very successful in generating models and empirical work about incentive systems. Some of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013143759
Cover Image
Capital Structure and a Firm's Workforce
Matsa, David A. - 2018
firm's workforce on its capital structure. For instance, high leverage often makes managing labor more difficult by … undermining employees' job security and increasing the need for costly workforce reductions. But firms can also use leverage to … needs and management of their workforce when making financing decisions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909869
Cover Image
Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations
Aperjis, Christina - 2010
In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations where the players meet but once. One player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137612
Cover Image
Investment Busts, Reputation, and the Temptation to Blend in with the Crowd
Grenadier, Steven R. - 2014
We provide a dynamic model of an industry in which agents strategically time liquidation decisions in an effort to protect their reputations. As in traditional models, agents delay liquidation attempting to signal their quality. However, when the industry faces a common shock that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066308
Cover Image
Media Bias and Reputation
Gentzkow, Matthew - 2005
A Bayesian consumer who is uncertain about the quality of an information source will infer that the source is of higher quality when its reports conform to the consumer's prior expectations. We use this fact to build a model of media bias in which firms slant their reports toward the prior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012784236
Cover Image
Market Structure, Reputation, and the Value of Quality Certification
Elfenbein, Daniel W. - 2014
Quality certification programs help consumers to identify high-quality products or sellers in markets with information asymmetries. Using data from eBay UK's online marketplace, we study how certification's impact on consumer demand varies with market- and seller-level attributes, exploiting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054867
Cover Image
Buying Reputation as a Signal of Quality : Evidence from an Online Marketplace
Li, Lingfang (Ivy) - 2016
Reputation is critical to foster trust in online marketplaces, yet leaving feedback is a public good that can be under-provided unless buyers are rewarded for it. Signaling theory implies that only high quality sellers would reward buyers for truthful feedback. We explore this scope for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012983684