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Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence
Edmans, Alex - 2017
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951861
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CEO Incentives and Firm Size
Baker, George P.; Hall, Brian J. - 2021
What determines CEO incentives? A confusion exists among both academics and practitioners about how to measure the strength of CEO incentives, and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. We show that while one measure of CEO...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013234372
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Pay Cuts for the Boss : Executive Compensation in the 1940s
Frydman, Carola - 2011
Executive pay fell during the 1940s, marking the last notable decrease in the past 70 years. We study this decline using a new panel dataset on the remuneration of top executives in 246 firms. We find that government regulation--including explicit salary restrictions and taxation--had, at best,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121089
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Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S : Perceptions, Facts and Challenges
Kaplan, Steven N. - 2012
In this paper, I consider the evidence for three common perceptions of U.S. public company CEO pay and corporate governance: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100668
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Executive Compensation : Facts
Clementi, Gian Luca - 2010
In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150549
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CEO Pay and the Rise of Relative Performance Contracts : A Question of Governance?
Bell, Brian - 2016
Would moving to relative performance contracts improve the alignment between CEO pay and performance? To address this we exploit the large rise in relative performance awards and the share of equity pay in the UK over the last two decades. Using new employer-employee matched datasets we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986698
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Credit Default Swaps, Agency Problems, and Management Incentives
Lee, Jongsub - 2017
: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941985
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Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers
Lim, Jongha - 2013
managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows … times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds … generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084738
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The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options
Hall, Brian J. - 2010
Detailed data about stock option contracts are used to measure and analyze the pay to performance incentives of executive stock options. Two main issues are addressed. The first is the pay to performance incentives created by the revaluation of stock option holdings. The findings suggest that if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763587
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Performance Incentives within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
Aggarwal, Rajesh K.; Samwick, Andrew A. - 2022
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013308346