Showing 1 - 10 of 296
. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135269
result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135394
Executive pay fell during the 1940s, marking the last notable decrease in the past 70 years. We study this decline using a new panel dataset on the remuneration of top executives in 246 firms. We find that government regulation--including explicit salary restrictions and taxation--had, at best,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121089
In this paper, I consider the evidence for three common perceptions of U.S. public company CEO pay and corporate governance: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100668
Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of … managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows … times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084738
In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150549
This essay reviews Bebchuk and Fried's quot;Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensationquot;. Bebchuk and Fried criticize the standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778036
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO%u2019s pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779748
In this article, we focus on how recent research advances can be used to address the following six questions: (1) How much does executive compensation cost the firm? (2) How much is executive compensation worth to the recipient? (3) How well does executive compensation work? (4) What are the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012787508
Data for a sample of 558 CEOs over 1985-1990 suggest substantial compensation premia for managers of diversified firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012788556