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We examine commonly observed forms of payment, such as milestones, royalties, or consulting contracts as ways of engaging inventors in the development of licensed inventions. Our theoretical model shows that when milestones are feasible, royalties are not optimal unless the licensing firm is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012750133
costly contracts or expensive reputations. Concurrently, experiments suggest that reciprocity is a potent substitute for law … trust-building contract device: satisfaction guaranteed. We find that satisfaction guaranteed indeed builds trust and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012957379
In this paper, we investigate incentive structures within partnerships. Partnerships provide a classic example of the tradeoff between risk spreading and moral hazard. The degree to which firms choose to spread risk and sacrifice efficiency incentives depends upon risk preferences, for which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212361
lifting) matter less when individuals are more patient and altruistic, or exhibit less negative reciprocity. To account for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834459
We study how reelection concerns affect reciprocity by elected leaders to the voters who elected them. If showing … reciprocity? We present a signalling model of candidate behavior, where we show that candidates may limit intrinsic reciprocity to … for instrumental purposes. We then present an experiment that tests these ideas in the laboratory and finds support for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013306903
procedures. A noisy signal, however, means that the optimal contract will involve terms that courts might view as punitive and so …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763577
We estimate the impact of venture capital (VC) contract terms on startup outcomes and the split of value between the … power to receive more investor-friendly terms compared to the contract that maximizes startup values. Better VCs still …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865753
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013232756
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236722
This paper analyzes optimal and equilibrium insurance contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard, comparing them with those under a single informational asymmetry. The complex interactions of self-selection and moral hazard constraints have important consequences. We develop an analytic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013077944