The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to … managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution … of incentives and responsibilities for other members of the top management team. An extension of the standard principal … responsibility. The aggregate pay-performance sensitivity of the top management team is quite substantial, at $30.24 per thousand …

We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to … ownership overlap, including mergers in the asset management industry and the growth of indexing, could in fact diminish …

Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …