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Age Discrimination Laws and Labor Market Efficiency
Neumark, David - 1997
In Lazear's (1979) model of efficient long-term incentive contracts, employers impose involuntary retirement based on age. This model implies that age discrimination laws, which bar involuntary terminations based on age, discourage the use of such contracts and reduce efficiency. Alternatively,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472726
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Identification and Efficiency Bounds for the Average Match Function under Conditionally Exogenous Matching
Graham, Bryan S. - 2016
. Consider the following matching mechanism: take a random draw from the `W=w_j` subgroup of the first population and match her … function (AMF), denote the expected output associated with this match. We show that (i) the AMF is identified when matching is … conditionally exogenous, (ii) conditionally exogenous matching is compatible with a pairwise stable aggregate matching equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456576
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Group reputations, stereotypes, and cooperation in a repeated labor market
Healy, Paul J. - In: The American economic review 97 (2007) 5, pp. 1751-1773
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003625044
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Aggregate and idiosyncratic risk in a frictional labor market
Rudanko, Leena - In: The American economic review 101 (2011) 6, pp. 2823-2843
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009378403
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Specific capital and vintage effects on the dynamics of unemployment and vacancies
Eyigungor, Burcu - In: The American economic review 100 (2010) 3, pp. 1214-1237
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008749090
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Preference Signaling in Matching Markets
Coles, Peter - 2010
Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462472
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A Formal Test of Assortative Matching in the Labor Market
Abowd, John M. - 2009
We estimate a structural model of job assignment in the presence of coordination frictions due to Shimer (2005). The coordination friction model places restrictions on the joint distribution of worker and firm effects from a linear decomposition of log labor earnings. These restrictions permit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463103
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Heterogeneity and Cyclical Unemployment
Bils, Mark - 2009
We model worker heterogeneity in the rents from being employed in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model of matching and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463483
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Median Stable Matching
Schwarz, Michael - 2009
We define the median stable matching for two-sided matching markets with side payments and prove constructively that it …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463958
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Labor Market Fluctuations in the Small and in the Large
Rogerson, Richard - 2008
Shimer's calibrated version of the Mortensen-Pissarides model generates unemployment fluctuates much smaller than the data. Hagedorn and Manovskii present an alternative calibration that yields fluctuations consistent with the data, but this has been challenged by Costain and Reiter, who say it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464775