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constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469645
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086
respect to takeovers, states have incentives to produce rules that excessively protect incumbent managers. The development of … policy basis, and, more importantly, they have provided managers with a wider and more open-ended latitude to engage in … though they could have done otherwise, to impose antitakeover protections on shareholders, who did not appear to favor them …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471028
The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to … managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471137
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326
This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468885
more than is optimal for shareholders and, to camouflage the extraction of rents, executive compensation might be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470054