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Gun For Hire : Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods?

Andreoni, James - 2011

This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the "hired gun" mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461626

Tax Competition and Migration : The Race-to-the-Bottom Hypothesis Revisited

Razin, Assaf - 2011

Oates reminds us that tax competition among localities in the presence of capital mobility, may lead to inefficiently low tax rates (and benefits). In contrast, the Tiebout paradigm suggests that tax competition yields an efficient outcome, so that there are no gains from tax coordination. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461987

Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem

Aghion, Philippe - 2009

The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463482

Volatile Policy and Private Information : The Case of Monetary Policy

Jones, Larry E. - 1999

In this paper we study how volatility in monetary policy affects economic performance in the presence of endogenously chosen information structures. To isolate the effects produced by the interaction of uncertainty in monetary policy and (possibly) asymmetric information, we consider a model in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471724

The Impact of Counterfeit Victims in the Victim Marketplace

Ban, Mingyuan; Qian, Yi; Gong, Qiang; Aquino, Karl - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2025

victims' market in a collective reputation framework. By analyzing three types of individuals who signal their victim status …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015194973

Fair Pricing

Rotemberg, Julio J. - 2004

I suppose that consumers see a firm as fair if they cannot reject the hypothesis that the firm is somewhat benevolent towards them. Consumers that can reject this hypothesis become angry, which is costly to the firm. I show that firms that wish to avoid this anger will keep their prices rigid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467772

The Dynamics of Seller Reputation : Theory and Evidence from eBay

Cabral, Luis - 2004

We propose a basic theoretical model of eBay's reputation mechanism, derive a series of implications and empirically … receives a negative rating for the first time his reputation decreases and so does his effort level. This implies a decline in … more to gain from buying a reputation' by building up a record of favorable feedback through purchases rather than sales …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468330

Image Versus Information : Changing Societal Norms and Optimal Privacy

Ali, S. Nageeb - 2016

reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456472

Credit History : The Changing Nature of Scientific Credit

Gans, Joshua S. - 2013

This paper considers the role of the allocation of scientific credit in determining the organization of science. We examine changes in that organization and the nature of credit allocation in the past half century. Our contribution is a formal model of that organizational choice that considers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459123

Exploring Tradeoffs in the Organization of Scientific Work : Collaboration and Scientific Reward

Bikard, Michaël - 2013

When do scientists and other knowledge workers organize into collaborative teams and why do they do so for some projects and not others? At the core of this important organizational choice is, we argue, a tradeoff between the productive efficiency of collaboration and the credit allocation that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459704