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Performance Incentives Within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450
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Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives
Benmelech, Efraim - 2008
Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
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The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Compensation
Crocker, Keith J. - 2006
This paper examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the … contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466016
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Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation : Theory and Evidence
Aggarwal, Rajesh - 1996
. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473194
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Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?
Gabaix, Xavier - 2006
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300
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Uncovering the Hidden Effort Problem
Ben-Rephael, Azi; Carlin, Bruce Ian; Da, Zhi; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021
We use machine learning to analyze minute-by-minute Bloomberg online status data and study how the effort provision of top executives in public corporations affects firm value. While executives likely spend most of their time doing other activities, Bloomberg usage data allows us to characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482657
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Supervisors and Performance Management Systems
Frederiksen, Anders - 2017
Supervisors occupy central roles in production and performance monitoring. We study how heterogeneity in performance evaluations across supervisors affects employee and supervisor careers and firm outcomes using data on the performance system of a Scandinavian service sector firm. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455330
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Compensation Matters : Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm
Bartel, Ann - 2013
Due to the limited availability of firm-level compensation data, there is little empirical evidence on the impact of compensation plans on personal productivity. We study an international law firm that moves from high-powered individual incentives towards incentives for "leadership" activities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459249
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Executive Compensation : Six Questions that Need Answering
Abowd, John M. - 1999
In this article, we focus on how recent research advances can be used to address the following six questions: (1) How much does executive compensation cost the firm? (2) How much is executive compensation worth to the recipient? (3) How well does executive compensation work? (4) What are the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471670
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Valuing the Reload Features of Executive Stock Options
Huddart, Steven - 1999
Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, the grant date value of executive stock options excludes the value of any reload feature because, at the time of writing the standard in 1995, the Financial Accounting Standards Board believed it was not feasible to value a reload...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471780