Showing 1 - 10 of 681
Can incorporating expectations-based-reference-dependence (EBRD) considerations reduce seemingly dominated choices in the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism? We run two experiments (total N = 500) where participants are randomly assigned into one of four DA variants--{static, dynamic} * {student...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013462684
We propose a political economy mechanism that explains the presence of fiscal regimes punctuated by crisis periods. Our model focuses on the interaction between successive deficit-biased governments subject to i.i.d. fiscal shocks. We show that the economy transitions between a fiscally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013435163
We study pairwise trading mechanisms in the presence of private information and limited commitment, whereby either trader can walk away from a proposed trade when he learns the trading price. We show that when one trader's information is relevant for the other trader's value of the asset,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457173
A solution to marketplace information asymmetries is to have trading partners publicly rate each other post-transaction. Many have shown that these ratings are effective; we show that their effectiveness deteriorates over time. The problem is that ratings are prone to inflation, with raters...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479806
Deferred Acceptance (DA), a widely implemented algorithm, is meant to improve allocations: under classical preferences, it induces preference-concordant rankings. However, recent evidence shows that--in both real, large-stakes applications and experiments--participants frequently play seemingly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012480338
We compute optimal mechanism designs for each of a sequence of size-discovery sessions, at which traders submit reports of their excess inventories of an asset to a session operator, which allocates transfers of cash and the asset. The mechanism design induces truthful reports of desired trades...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453567
The attractive properties of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm rest on the assumption of perfect information. Yet field studies of school matching show that information is imperfect, particularly for disadvantaged students. We model costly strategic learning when schools are ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012794614
Blockchain consensus is a state whereby each node in a network agrees on the current state of the blockchain. Existing protocols achieve consensus via a contest or voting procedure to select one node as a dictator to propose new blocks. However, this procedure can still lead to potential attacks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334407
This paper presents the first empirical evidence of interdependent values and strategic responses by market participants in a two-sided matching market. We consider the market for medical school programs in Denmark, which uses a centralized assignment mechanism. Leveraging unique administrative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014528365
In many market-design applications, a new mechanism is introduced to reform an existing institution. Compared to the design of a mechanism in isolation, the presence of a status-quo system introduces both challenges and opportunities for the designer. We study this problem in the context of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014528408