This paper considers the valuation of a spread call when asset prices are lognormal. The implicit strategy of the Kirk formula is to exercise if the price of the long asset exceeds a given power function of the price of the short asset. We derive a formula for the spread call value, conditional...

The existence of a financial gas market motivates the analysis of gas storage as a separate asset, using the market value context for utilization and valuation. In the recent literature, gas storage is typically analysed within a framework with a simple one-factor price dynamics that is solved...

The international integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy. One question is the implications that the overall international regulatory regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic merger activity. In particular, do non-coordinated policies stimulate...

We analyze optimal incentive contracts in a model where the probability of court enforcement is determined by the costs spent on contracting. We show that contract costs matter for incentive provision, both in static spot contracts and repeated game relational contracts. We find that social...

When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement may reduce the worker's effort, but lead to higher-powered incentive...

The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can cooperate by helping each other, i.e. provide effort that increases the...

We analyze a situation where common noise makes compensation based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) desirable, but where the agents' ability to hold-up values ex post obstruct the implementation of optimal RPE schemes. The principal can take actions to constrain the agents' hold-up power...