Showing 1 - 10 of 49
The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324920
The purpose of this paper is to represent in which way a stable and no negligible growth in demand can affect the level of sustainability of collusion. For the European Commission this assumption is seen as a factor that disincentives collusion and pushes to a competitive behavior. This fact...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335729
Allowing firms to cooperate in their R&D is an industrial policy, which has received much attention in recent economics literature. Many of these contributions are based on the seminal analysis of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). We provide a general version of their model, which encompasses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608400
The paper proposes a theory of the anti-competitive effects of debt finance based on the interaction between capital structure, managerial incentives, and firms' ability to sustain collusive agreements. It shows that shareholders' commitments that reduce conflicts with debtholders such as hiring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608557
proliferating their products. It is shown that a selective pruning within the cartel always occurs. Moreover, by associating a … cooperative (or coalitional) stability of the whole industry cartel is the equidistance of firms’ products along the quality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011662439
In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011492383
In this paper we analyse a common agency model in which agents can choose with how many principals they want to work, while principals cannot condition contracts on the agent's decision to accept other contracts. In this case of "non-intrinsic" common agency we characterise the equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608547
I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608616
Many voluntary agreements (VA's) fall under the European or Dutch cartel prohibition (Article 81 EC, Article 6 Mededingingswet). This paper starts with an abstract description of the relation between competition and environmental protection. Particular attention is paid to the role in this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608642
This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279451