Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability

The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Kartell \| Theorie \| Collusion \| Partial cartels \| Trigger strategies \| Optimal punishment

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Series:	Nota di Lavoro ; 44.2004
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/117922 [Handle] RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.44 [RePEc]
Classification:	L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324920