Showing 1 - 10 of 29
A tragedy of the commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270955
We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324955
We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312258
The purpose of this article is to analyze how the presence of a competitive fringe, composed by price taker firms, can affect the sustainability of collusive equilibria. Our starting point is that there exists a diffused misunderstanding about its strategical role as collusive minus factor. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312265
We generalize some recent results developed in static policy games with multiple players, to a dynamic context. We find that the classical theory of economic policy can be usefully applied to a strategic context of difference games: if one player satisfies the Golden Rule, then either all other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312381
We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312400
This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312532
Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simultaneous move game of network formation: players announce independently the links they wish to form, and links are formed only under mutual consent. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312598
This paper considers a simple communication network characterized by an endogenous architecture and an imperfect transmission of information. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework where self - interested individuals can form or delete links and, occasionally, are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312654
We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to influence the government's choice on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270938