agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this …, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion. …

besides reducing the agency costs of debt finance also greatly facilitate tacit collusion in product markets. Concentrated or …-proofness), thereby "exporting" collusion through leverage in otherwise competitive downstream product markets. …

reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one …-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise …

of sustainability of collusion. For the European Commission this assumption is seen as a factor that disincentives … collusion and pushes to a competitive behavior. This fact maybe is not so obvious and I have shown that what is important is the … implement collusion before and after entry as a subgames perfect equilibrium. The final conclusion is that demand growth …

differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous … the market may have contradictory effects on the incentive of firms to collude: it can make collusion easier for bottom …

may remove all managers' short-run gains from deviation making collusion supportable at any discount factor. The results …

affected by tacit collusion or price manipulation when the corresponding polluting product market is oligopolistic. We analyze …

dimension of the fringe such that collusion is a Nash equilibrium of the static game. …