Similar Search Results

Sources of performance improvement in privatised firms: A clinical study of the global telecommunications industry

Megginson, William L.; Bortolotti, Bernardo; D'Souza, Juliet - 2001

significant declines in leverage. However, we also find numerous separable effects for variables measuring regulation, competition … leverage and a significant decrease in employment, while price regulation significantly increases profitability. Major … financial and operating performance of telecommunications companies improves significantly after privatisation, but that a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608788

Do international roaming alliances harm consumers?

Bühler, Benno - 2009

endogenously formed if not prevented by regulation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279387

The regulation of professions in Italy

Brosio, Giorgio - 1997

The paper deals with the regulation of professions in Italy. It is a very traditional system of regulation based on … inputs control. This regulation is clearly excessive for most of the professions. In fact, market failures - both in terms of …. In fact, it is no longer true - at least for most of the professions - that output regulation is an inherently difficult …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608310

Use of Long-term Auctions for Network Investment

McDaniel, Tanga; Neuhoff, Karsten - 2003

Short-term auctions for access to entry terminals of the British gas-network appear to successfully allocate scarce resources and capture scarcity rent. Now long-term auctions are being introduced to guide future capacity expansion decisions. In our model the fraction of rights issued in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325061

Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence

Guerriero, Carmine - 2006

This paper analyzes the effects of supervisors' (i.e., regulators and judges) selection rules on regulated prices. A checks and balances' regulatory review process strengthens the role of the judicial power and election increases the populism of implicitly motivated supervisors. Election arises...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312360

Collusive Agreements in Vertically Differentiated Markets

Marini, Marco A. - 2017

This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011662439

Vertical Differentiation and Collusion: Cannibalization or Proliferation?

Gabszewicz, Jean J.; Marini, Marco A.; Tarola, Ornella - 2016

In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011492383

Self-defeating antitrust laws: How leniency programs solve Bertrand's paradox and enforce collusion in auctions

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2000

I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608616

Civil liability, safety and nuclear parks: Is concentrated management better?

Mondello, Gérard - 2011

Ultra-hazardous risky activities as the nuclear industry cannot be considered as normal industries i.e. without abnormal environmental and health risks. This theoretical paper studies the industrial organization of electro nuclear sectors from the view point of the general cost of impact...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279648

Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability

Escrihuela-Villar, Marc - 2004

The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324920