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Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy

Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256

a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group …, public goods provision level, and how to share the provision costs. The FRP-Core is always nonempty in public goods economies … but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996

Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons

Auster, Sarah; Gottardi, Piero - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 3, pp. 927-970

We study directed search equilibria in a decentralized market with adverse selection, where uninformed buyers post general trading mechanisms and informed sellers select one of them. We show that this has differing and significant implications with respect to the traditional approach, based on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104602

Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement

Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512

I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553

Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification

Pereyra, Juan; Silva, Francisco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 2, pp. 793-836

Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014325235

Robust contracting under double moral hazard

Carroll, Gabriel; Bolte, Lukas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1623-1663

We study contracting when both principal and agent have to exert noncontractible effort for production to take place. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees to each party in spite of the surrounding uncertainty....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440091

Experimentation in organizations

Moroni, Sofia - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1403-1450

We consider a moral hazard problem in which a principal provides incentives to a team of agents to work on a risky project. The project consists of two milestones of unknown feasibility. While working unsuccessfully, the agents' private beliefs regarding the feasibility of the project decline....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327131

Nonlinear pricing competition with private capacity information

Nazerzadeh, Hamid; Perakis, Georgia - In: Operations research 64 (2016) 2, pp. 329-340

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011485493

Subjective expected utility in games

Di Tillio, Alfredo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 3, pp. 287-323

This paper extends Savage's subjective approach to probability and utility from decision problems under exogenous uncertainty to choice in strategic environments. Interactive uncertainty is modeled both explicitly, using hierarchies of preference relations, the analogue of beliefs hierarchies,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700273

Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup

Zhao, Rui R. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 1, pp. 85-121

This paper studies bilateral trade in which the seller makes a hidden investment that influences the buyer's hidden valuation. In general it is impossible to implement both first-best efficient trade and efficient investment using budget-balanced trading mechanisms. The paper fully characterizes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700620

Rewards and punishments : informal contracting through social preferences

Chassang, Sylvain; Zehnder, Christian - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 1145-1179

This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671838