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Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy

Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256

a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group …, public goods provision level, and how to share the provision costs. The FRP-Core is always nonempty in public goods economies … but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996

Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement

Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512

I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553

Many-to-many matching and price discrimination

Gomes, Renato; Pavan, Alessandro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 1005-1052

We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private information about (vertical …) characteristics that determine match values. Our analysis reveals how matching patterns reflect cross-subsidization between sides … compensated by the gains from agents-consumers. We show how such cross-subsidization can be achieved through matching rules that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671852

Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification

Silva, Francisco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 3, pp. 971-1014

I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent's type only affects the principal's utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent's type, which can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104604

Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values

Mylovanov, Timofiy; Tröger, Thomas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 465-488

We show that a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by an informed principal exists in a large class of environments with “generalized private values”: the agents’ payoﬀ functions are independent of the principal’s type. The solution is an extension of Maskin and Tirole’s...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689318

A principal-agent model of sequential testing

Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas Jóver - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 425-463

This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a dynamic information acquisition process. In every period, the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Each signal may or may not provide definitive evidence in favor of the good state. Neither...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689319

A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game

Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey; Stole, Lars A. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1151-1189

We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937306

Technical note: incomplete information VCG contracts for common agency

Alon, Tal; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Lavi, Ron; Shamash, Elisheva - In: Operations research 72 (2024) 1, pp. 288-299

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014505121

Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1547-1586

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488

Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent

Barron, Daniel; Georgiadis, George; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 715-761

Consider an agent who can costlessly add mean-preserving noise to his output. To deter such risk-taking, the principal optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability, this concavity constraint binds...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308620