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Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints

Abizada, Azar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 735-756

We study two-sided matching where one side (colleges) can make monetary transfers (offer stipends) to the other …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671961

Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention

Moreno, Diego; Wooders, John - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 601-639

We study non-stationary dynamic decentralized markets with adverse selection in which trade is bilateral and prices are determined by bargaining. Examples include labor markets, housing markets, and markets for financial assets. We characterize equilibrium, and identify the dynamics of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672004

Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability

Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Massó, Jordi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 547-586

We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672008

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773

A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276

Price discrimination through communication

Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673357

Transparency and price formation

Kaya, Ayça; Liu, Qingmin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 341-383

We study the role that price transparency plays in determining the efficiency and surplus division in a sequential bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric information. Under natural assumptions on type distributions, and for any discount factor, we show that the unobservability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673489

Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information

Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 483-513

We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674460

Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 505-525

This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856695

Common enrollment in school choice

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Yenmez, M. Bumin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1237-1270

Increasingly, more school districts across the US are using centralized admissions for charter, magnet, and neighborhood schools in a common enrollment system. We first show that, across all school-participation patterns, full participation in the common (or unified) enrollment system leads to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158787

School choice under partial fairness

Dur, Umut Mert; Gitmez, A. Arda; Yılmaz, Özgür - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1309-1346

the Student Exchange under Partial Fairness (SEPF). Each member of this class gives a partially stable matching that is … not Pareto dominated by another partially stable matching (i.e. constrained efficient in the class of partially stable … matchings). Moreover, any constrained efficient matching that Pareto improves upon a partially stable matching can be obtained …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158795