We examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. Specifically, we show that when the proposer uses a delegate, his share increases. Since in such a case the proposer does not use the delegate as a commitment device, this effect identifies an additional...

We provide a collusive framework with heterogeneity among firms, investment, entry, and exit. It is a symmetric-information model in which it is hard to sustain collusion when there is an active firm that is likely to exit in the near future. Numerical analysis is used to compare a collusive to...

We consider a semicollusive market where firms compete in a long-run variable, such as investment in capital or capacity, and collude with respect to a short-run variable, such as price or market shares. Our concern is with the potential destabilizing effect of the long-run competition on the...

The article is concerned with market behavior when firms have limited ability to handle effectively the complexity of changing market conditions and strategic interaction . Modelling the managerial bounded rationality by using the concept of strategic complexity as measured by a finite...

Recent progress toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East has led to a relaxation of the enforcement of the Arab economic boycott of Israel. This in turn has led to the entry of all the major Japanese and Korean automobile manufacturers into the Israeli market. We examine the effect of the...