This paper tests the behavioral equivalence of a class of strategically-equivalent mechanisms that also do not differ in terms of their procedures. In a private value setting, we introduce a family of mechanisms, so-called Mechanism (α), that generalizes the standard first-price sealed-bid...

We deal with the problem of providing incentives for the implementation of competitive outcomes in a pure-exchange economy with finitely many households. We construct a feasible price-quantity mechanism, which fully implements Walras equilibria via Nash equilibria in fairly general environments....

There are around 400 advertising networks that match opportunities for “display” advertising, which include banner ads, video ads and indeed all ads other than text-based ads, on web pages and candidate advertisements. This is about a <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$${\$}25$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> billion business annually. The present...</equationsource></inlineequation>

We consider how information concentration affects a seller’s revenue in common value auctions. The common value is a function of <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> random variables partitioned among <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$m \le n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> bidders. For each partition, the seller devises an optimal mechanism. We show that whenever the value...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation>

Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that if one seller and one buyer have independent private valuations for an indivisible object then no individually rational and incentive compatible trading mechanism can guarantee ex post efficiency when gains from trade are uncertain. Makowski and...

The Federal Communications Commission currently utilizes a simultaneous multi-round ascending bid auction to allocate Personal Communication Services licenses. In the auction, participants are allowed to withdraw standing bids at a penalty. The penalty is equal to the maximum of zero or the...