Abrahamsen, Aeppli, Atukeren, Graff, Müller and Schips (2005) object to Kehoe and Prescott's (2002) characterization of the Swiss economy as being in a great depression over the period 1974-2000. They argue that (1) depressions should be defined in terms of declines in labor productivity rather...

The papers in this volume study nine depressions - both from the interwar period in Europe and America and from more recent times and Latin America - using a common framework. All of the papers rely on growth accounting to decompose changes in output into the portions due to changes in factor...

International trade is frequently thought of as a production technology in which the inputs are exports and the outputs are imports. Exports are transformed into imports at the rate of the price of exports relative to the price of imports: the reciprocal of the terms of trade. Cast this way, a...

Chile and Mexico exoperienced severe economic crises in the early 1980s. This paper analyzes four possible explanations for why Chile recovered much faster than did Mexico. Comparing data from the two countries allows us to rule out a monetarist explanation, an explanation on falls in real wages...

More advanced technologies demand higher degrees of specialization - and longer chains of production connecting raw inputs to final outputs. Longer production chains are subject to a "weakest link" effect: they are more fragile and more prone to failure. Optimal chain length is determined by the...

In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions. Recent research has focused on the case of "frequent monitoring," where the time interval between periods becomes small. Here...

A simple example of a stochastic games with irreversibility is studied and it is shown that the folk theorem fails in a robust way. In this game of Castle on the Hill, for a broad range of discount factors, including those close to me, equilibrium is unique. Moreover, the equilibrium for large...

We examine a simple theory of altruism in which players' payoffs are linear in their own monetary income and their opponents. The weight on the opponent's income is private information and varies in the population, depending, moreover, on what the opponent's coefficient is believed to be. Using...

Introduction to the Special Issue on Dynamic Games (Copyright: Elsevier)