Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Levine, David |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Dynamics. - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED. - Vol. 10.2007, 2, p. 173-192
|
Publisher: |
Society for Economic Dynamics - SED |
Subject: | Repeated games | Imperfect monitoring | Diffusion process | Folk theorem | Repeated moral hazard | Continuous-time limit |
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