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Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2000

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956471

The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany

Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2001

competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956370

Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1999

game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient …, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956380

Implementing efficient market structure

Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2000

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956424

A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction

Perry, Motty; Wolfstetter, Elmar; Zamir, Shmuel - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1998

, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956456

Third- and higher-price auctions

Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1995

This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution … auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders' valuations, and bidders raise their bids when one moves to a higher price auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956519

Scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1998

the converse is not generally true. Moreover, first- and second-price auctions are not always revenue equivalent. Indeed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956588

Learning to bid: An experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games

Güth, Werner; Ivanova, Radosveta; Königstein, Manfred; … - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1999

We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983519

The repo auctions of the European Central Bank and the vanishing quota puzzle

Nautz, Dieter; Oechssler, Jörg - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1999

Weekly repo auctions are the European Central Bank's most important policy instrument. Provided that banks bid … seriously, these auctions should reveal useful information about banks' liquidity needs and the stance of monetary policy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983605

Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen: Eine Diskussion

Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1995

Dieser Diskussionsbeitrag kommentiert Güths axiomatische Begründung der Zweit-Preis-Auktion. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch Güths umfangreiche Analyse der Lambda-Auktion durch eine einfache und anschaulich interpretierbare Lösung ersetzt.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983668