A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction

This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Perry, Motty ; Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Zamir, Shmuel
Institutions:	Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation ökonomischer Prozesse, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	Auctions

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	SFB 373 Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 1998,63
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956456