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dominant Nash equilibrium together characterize the unique evolutionarily stable set in generic and symmetric n×n-coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281162
dominant Nash equilibrium together characterize the unique evolutionarily stable set in generic and symmetric n×n-coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649475
This paper analyzes a finite horizon, sequential move pricing duopoly, restricting attention to Markov-strategies. The solution yields stationary patterns, independent of initial conditions, where the reaction-functions follow cycles of three periods. The market price never settles down, and is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651507
×2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes … of symmetric 2×2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive … spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771174
In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281156
Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce cleverness of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281177
In (Viossat, 2006, The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior), it was shown that the replicator dynamics may eliminate all pure strategies used in correlated equilibrium, so that only strategies that do not take part in any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281341
In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281359
This paper studies the evolution of peoples' models of how other people think - their theories of mind. First, this is formalized within the level-k model, which postulates a hierarchy of types, such that type k plays a k times iterated best response to the uniform distribution. It is found...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281423
limit. Applied to 2x2 Coordination Games, the Pareto dominant equilibrium is selected for a sufficiently large sample size …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281436