This paper illustrates on two examples the use of some multivariate statistical analysis methods for describing profiles of preferences. The first example is the Social Choise and Welfare council election of 1999 and the second is a school-case fictious one. The school case example shows how...

It is shown that the source of Sen's and Arrow's impossibility theorems is that Sen's Liberal condition and Arrow's IIA counter the critical assumption that voters have transitive preferences. But if the procedures are not permitted to treat the transitivity of individual preferences as a valued...

Using Brams and Fishburn's report and data, the SC&W election is analyzed with an emphasis on explaining the theoretical reasons for the conflicting outcomes. In the process, some new results are obtained.

Elementary geometry is used to understand, extend and resolve basic informational difficulties in choice theory. This includes axiomatic conclusions such as Arrow's Theorem, Chichilnisky's dictator, and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result. In this manner new results about positional voting methods...

Beyond determining whether procedures can be manipulated, the real goal for any analysis of "strategic behavior" is to identify all settings where and when this can be done, who can do it, and what they should do. By applying the geometric approach of Saari [7, 8] to the Kemeny's Rule (KR), we...

By using geometry, a fairly complete analysis of Kemeny's rule (KR) is obtained. It is shown that the Borda Count (BC) always ranks the KR winner above the KR loser, and, conversely, KR always ranks the BC winner above the BC loser. Such KR relationships fail to hold for other positional...