Among a group of selfish agents, we consider nomination correspondences that determine who should get a prize on the basis of each agent’s nomination. Holzman and Moulin (Econometrica 81:173–196, <CitationRef CitationID="CR4">2013</CitationRef>) show that (i) there is no nomination function that satisfies the axioms of impartiality,...</citationref>

We consider economies with a single indivisible good and money. We characterize the set of mechanisms that satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, equal compensation, and demand monotonicity. There are three types of mechanisms which have the following properties: (i) they determine...

We study the possibility of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms in pure exchange economies. In his remarkable paper, Zhou (1991) establishes an elegant impossibility result: there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and non-dictatorial mechanism in the two-agent case. He conjectures that there...