We characterize the Pareto correspondence, the core and the Walras solution using the axioms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Consistency and its converse are defined with respect to suitably constructed reduced economies for each case. Our results hold for the...

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with...

ABSTRACT: Stochastic stability is applied to the problem of exchange. We analyze the stochastic stability of two dynamic trading processes in a simple housing market. In both models, traders meet in pairs at random and exchange their houses when trade is mutually beneficial, but occasionally...

Consider an exchange economy where agents are arbitragers, in that they try to upset allocations imagining plausible beneficial trades. With an introspective algorithm, each agent constructs an interactive choice set (ICS), i.e., a set of bundles that he considers achievable through a sequence...

We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotone rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together with a bilateral principle,...

Two important articles in the literature on decentralized strategic markets are Gale (1986) and McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991). McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991) claim to have generalized Gale (1986) in several respects. In doing so, they introduce mainly two modifications: 1. unbounded short...

This paper studies implementation of taxation methods in one-commodity environments in which the incomes of the agents are unknown to the planner. Feasibility out of equilibrium imposes that the mechanism depend on the environment. We present two mechanisms. The first one, which requires...