Oblivious equilibrium is a new solution concept for approximating Markov perfect equilibrium in dynamic models of imperfect competition among heterogeneous firms and has recently been used in multiple economic studies. In this paper, we present algorithms for computing oblivious equilibrium and...

Problem definition: We consider the mechanism design problem of finding an optimal pay-as-bid mechanism in which the platform chooses an assortment of suppliers that balances the tradeoff between two objectives: providing enough variety to accommodate heterogeneous buyers, yet at low prices....

Framework agreements (FAs) are procurement mechanisms used in private and public organizations by which a central procurement agency selects an assortment of products, typically through auctions, and then affiliated organizations can purchase from the selected assortment as needs arise. In...

This note revisits the identification theorems of B. Brown (1983) and Roehrig (1988). We describe an error in the proofs of the main identification theorems in these papers, and provide an important counterexample to the theorems on the identification of the reduced form. Specifically, the...